

Assessing Crisis Communication Teamwork Performance during a Terrorist Attack: A Pragma-Dialectic Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Background On October 22, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier standing guard at the Canadian National War Memorial.

Analysis Using a pragma-dialectical approach, this article analyzes the three chronological sequences of communication related to the attack: the pre-crisis period, the crisis itself, and the post-crisis management.

Conclusions and implications This article asserts that before the crisis, the constitution and the functioning of the crisis management team impacted its ability to communicate effectively. Insufficient communication prompted the crisis to remain in the spotlight numerous years after its conclusion.

Keywords Crisis communication; Government of Canada; Terrorist attack; Shared mental models; Media relations

RÉSUMÉ

Contexte Le 22 octobre 2014, une attaque au fusil de Michael Zehaf-Bibeau créé une crise que cet article analyse du point de vue de la communication.

Analyse En utilisant une approche pragmatique et dialectique, cet article analyse les trois séquences chronologiques de communication liées à l'attaque : la période précédant la crise, la crise elle-même et la gestion de l'après-crise.

Conclusions et implications Cet article affirme qu'avant la crise, la constitution et le fonctionnement de l'équipe de gestion de crise ont eu un impact sur sa capacité à communiquer efficacement. L'absence ou l'insuffisance de communication a conduit la crise à rester d'actualité de nombreuses années après sa conclusion.

Mots clés La communication de crise; le gouvernement du Canada; attaque terroriste; partage des modèles mentaux; relations avec les médias

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Introduction

On October 22, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fired three bullets into Corporal Nathan Cirillo's back as he was standing guard at the Canadian National War Memorial. Zehaf-Bibeau then fled to Parliament Hill, where political parties were holding their caucus. Zehaf-Bibeau was killed after a long exchange of gunfire. The government immediately placed this sanctuary of Canadian political life in lockdown. Two days before the Zehaf-Bibeau attack, another soldier had been run over and killed in Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu, Québec. Zehaf-Bibeau's attack exacerbated tensions and led to a crisis in the government. Various departments were ineffective in coordinating communication and their attempts at crisis management revealed a number of challenges as well as shortcomings. This article examines the Canadian government's implementation of communication strategies in the wake of the Zehaf-Bibeau attack.

Two factors must be considered to understand the complex dynamics surrounding government communication during this crisis. First, terrorist attacks are distinctive both in their severity and their cross-border scope; they are characterized by uncertainty and involve multiple organizations (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010). Moreover, the scale and urgency of the situation render the coordination of crisis management even more difficult. This reality is particularly well illustrated by the challenge of communicating about a crisis at the height of tensions, which in this case allowed for rumours of a second shooter to spread. And yet, the ability to take control of events is one of the primary indicators of effective crisis communication (Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017; Fowler, 2017; Lee, 2016). Both the configuration and the operation of communications within the federal government (Marland, 2017) proved to be liabilities in managing this crisis. In crisis, communication and its role in sharing information, ideas, and feelings is of crucial importance.

This article examines the case according to five critical tasks of strategic crisis leadership as outlined by Arjen Boin, Paul 't Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius (2017): sense making, meaning making, decision-making and coordinating, accounting, and learning. Based on this framework, this article will assess the use of communication in sense making during this crisis, specifically looking at its role in aiding key players and stakeholders to understand the course of events as they unfolded. This case demonstrates the impact of inadequate shared mental models, a cognitive construct of team members' behaviour based on their understanding of facts and their interpretation of events (Druskat & Pescosolido, 2002; Helsloot, 2008). This study also examines the structure of the teams assigned to respond to a crisis, exploring the role assigned to communication by the National Emergency Response System (NERS). The team in charge of crisis response had to deal with the problem of equivocality and ambiguity in decision-making (Coombs, 2015a). The analysis of this case also reveals how the dialectic of baronies—old personal conflicts and inter-institutional power struggles obstructed the processes necessary for effective decision-making (Renaudin & Altemaire, 2007).

The second portion of the analysis assesses how the media perceived the coordination of efforts and how messages were conceived during the crisis. The assumption is that the quality of the exchange between the Government Operations Centre (GOC)

and the media is directly related to the nature of their teamwork, and this failure in collaborative processes ultimately impacted the GOC's ability to communicate effectively using the media, particularly during a press conference in the crucial early moments of the crisis. Overall, this case demonstrates that the institutions assigned to deal with a crisis facing the federal government of Canada were ill-prepared to properly communicate both from structural and functional perspectives.

Literature review on crisis communication and terrorism

The study of crisis communication and terrorism has substantially developed since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, in New York (Barnhurst, 1991; Heilbrun, Wolbransky, Shah, & Kelly, 2010). Aino Ruggiero and Marita Vos (2013) reviewed a decade of research on these two topics, arguing that since most research has been on chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) hazards, there is a need for a multi-channel communication approach. Terrorists are perceived to have multiple communication objectives (Falkheimer, 2014; Matusitz, 2013). In fact, terrorism communication strategies are far more complex than just seeking publicity (Rothenberger, 2017). Terrorism is a form of persuasive communication (Tuman, 2010) and a disaster developed as a public relations strategy. Indeed terrorist attacks need an audience for the theatrics to shape and impact political climates (Rada, 1985; Richards, 2004). One of the main objectives of terrorism is fomenting a climate of fear to destabilize a government (Pattwell, Mitman, & Porpora, 2015). According to Brigitte Nacos (2007), terrorists pursue four objectives of communication specifically related to the media: 1) to attract the attention of a variety target audiences; 2) to generate recognition of their motivations; 3) to arouse the respect and sympathy of a part of the population; and 4) to obtain recognition as a relevant political actor on the particular subject they defend. The media thus end up being taken hostage by terrorism and find themselves in a kind of forced marriage that binds their destinies (Augé, 2016). In return, the media communications of terrorists contribute greatly to the creation or transformation of social representations. Moreover, in a terrorist situation, journalists depend heavily on government sources for information (Moeller, 2009).

A terror act creates a void waiting to be filled with information, and it generates division. That is why it is essential for a crisis management team to communicate a unified voice (Hargie & Irving, 2016). In this challenging environment, leadership communication skills take on increased importance during a terror attack (Canel & Sanders, 2010).

The quest for meaning during a crisis creates a confrontation between government argumentation and media frames of the crisis (Canel, 2012). This is one of the aspects that link communication to terrorism. Terrorist attacks are often accompanied by a loss of bearings among the general population, revealing undisclosed vulnerabilities. This is followed by the fear of further attacks in the near future, thereby heightening feverish anxiety within the general public (Goldstein, 2005; King, 2005).

In times of increased stress, such as during terrorist attacks, the support provided by strategic communications that combine persuasion and empathy remains a potent antidote against widespread panic (Ruggiero & Vos, 2013). Communication is also required to reinforce resiliency so that the public can better cope with constant fear

(Palenchar, Heath, & Orberton, 2004). In other words, communication becomes an effective remedy for the trauma suffered by the population; having a better grasp of the reality of events helps people to alleviate stress (Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 2010).

In more practical terms, the quality of communication also facilitates the evacuation or transportation of people away from dangerous sites (Zimmerman & Sherman, 2011). In the case of the attack on Parliament Hill, a lockdown was put in place, rather than evacuation, although this does not diminish the importance of communications strategies beyond the practical. The impact of the terrorist act and its direct effects depend very closely on the quality of the information received and shared. Communication may or may not channel the distress and panic that terrorists try to propagate because it greatly reduces uncertainty (Fischhoff, 2011).

Methodology

Using a pragma-dialectical approach (Yan, 2017), this article analyzes the three chronological sequences of communication related to the Zehaf-Bibeau attack: the pre-crisis period, including the nature and functioning of the GOC; the crisis itself, particularly the press conference following the crisis; and the post-crisis period, with a focus on the media's depiction of divisions within the GOC. The pragma-dialectic approach assesses discourses as "a speech of acts such as presenting a standpoint, casting doubts on a standpoint, advancing in favor of a standpoint and concluding what the result of a discussion is" (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003, p. 387). It is used in this article as a tool to analyze the argumentative structure of government communication.

This article then uses media coverage analysis (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2014) to examine how the media responded to government argumentation. On October 29, 2014, one week after the shooting occurred, there were 87 recorded results related to the post-terror event management in the Canadian Newsstand Major Dailies database. Indeed, with the convergence phenomenon created by the concentration of media ownership (Goyette-Côté, Carbasse, & George, 2012), articles written by a senior correspondent assigned to the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery or a columnist on that topic were in some cases reprised numerous times by different media outlets throughout the country. After eliminating repeat articles, nine were retained ($n = 9$) and were analyzed for this study using a deductive approach (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). More specifically, each news story was analyzed through a series of six questions to assess the frames used by media that are related to economic frames, capacity and resources frames, morality frames, law and order frames, security and defenses frames, and policy prescription and evaluation frames (Boydston, Gross, Resnik, & Smith, 2013; Matthes & Kohring, 2008). This material was used to examine how the government's arguments transpired in the media right after the press conference, and how the linguistic elements within the text reveal a "stakeholders quarrel" in post-crisis management. By assessing the media coverage of the terrorist attack, this study evaluates whether the government's communication efforts were convincing enough to have its key messages reprised, even partially, by the media.

This research builds on case study methodology, an approach centred on exploratory analysis that facilitates the understanding of a phenomenon (Alexandre, 2013) by producing an accurate description of events (Roy, 2016). It is common for re-

searchers to identify the concept of crisis, both its management and its communication, through case studies (Banyongen, 2016; Sellnow & Littlefield, 2005; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2008). Semi-direct interviews about the case were also conducted, but only four ($n = 4$) were directly related to the research question and retained: one from a higher manager at the GOC, one from a strategic public relations advisor at the Department of National Defense, and two from journalists (Josh Wingrove and another who asked not to be identified).

Overview of teamwork and communication within the National Emergency Response System


This section deals with the impact of internal organization and performance on communication management. It briefly summarizes important aspects of the National Emergency Response System (NERS) and then demonstrates how the ownership of team processes and outcomes, as well as an inadequate understanding of the shared meaning and the potential for multiple interpretations, led to poor communication during the management of the shooting on October 22. The section will assess the interaction and organization of work between different NERS stakeholders and the role allocated to communication by analyzing a selection of key documents including the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP), the *Public Safety and the Emergency Preparedness Act (PSDPA)*, the *Emergency Management Act (EMA)*, the *Federal Terrorism Response Plan (FTRP)*, and the *Communication Interoperability Strategy for Canada (CISC)*. This document analysis was also completed with the aid of semi-direct interviews with high-level managers of key NERS organizations to evaluate the functioning of the response system, as well as its communication management of the shooting on Parliament Hill.

The Government of Canada uses NERS as a framework to deal with emergencies and crises. NERS was developed in conjunction with provincial and territorial officials to enable coordinated efforts when responding to emergencies. This framework is based on measures outlined in the *Emergency Management Act* (art 6.1), which assigns the leadership role in managing emergencies and crisis situations to Public Safety Canada. Within that department, the GOC handles operational procedures. The GOC website states: “The Government Operations Centre (GOC) provides an all-hazards integrated federal emergency response to events (potential or actual, natural or human-induced, accidental or intentional) of national interest” (Canada, 2016, par. 1). One might, therefore, assume that a shooting at the heart of Parliament Hill falls within the GOC’s operational jurisdiction. It is, after all, committed to bringing all partners into a common environment to harmonize and synchronize their collective actions. The GOC is required to operate 24/7 to monitor developments, raise awareness, analyze and plan logistical support, and ensure coordination across all levels of government and with partners, including non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and international partners.

As far as crisis communication related to a terrorist attack is concerned, the above mission statements are more performative than realistic. In reality, while the GOC has a communications officer, communication strategy is mostly developed by the Public Safety Canada communication directorate. This produces a configuration that is com-

mon within government, where one agency, in this case the GOC, owns the content and subject matter experts while another group, in this case, the director-general of communications, is in charge of tools and strategy.

Figure 1: Outline of the main hypotheses



The rationale behind this article lies on the idea that issues related to a pre-crisis period such as nature and the functioning of the team, the lack of shared mental models and increased the equivocality, have impeded the GOC's attempts to properly, and efficiently manage communication during the crisis. This is evidenced by their incapacity to steal the thunder to dispel rumours of the second shooter and provide instructional messages through media. Moreover, these issues continued long after the crisis was declared over with an illustration of the power struggles between stakeholders that can be labelled as a dialectic of baronies.

Using theoretical frameworks concerning multidisciplinary teamwork, shared mental models, and the concept of equivocality, the following sections will expose the issues limiting effective communication for teams such as the GOC in the midst of a crisis event.

Government Operations Centre: The dialectic between C2 (control and command) and 3C (continuity, coordination, and cooperation)

Communication represents a vital component of crisis management. It frames perceptions and plays a role in how events are understood as they unfold (Putnam, 2006). However, the inception of a crisis management team (CMT) is important in order to develop effective communication strategies. When it comes to the composition and

functioning of a CMT, two main, but conflicting, approaches can be adopted: control and command (C2) is a top-down model deemed to be better adapted to a military environment, while an adaptive approach, defined as the continuity, coordination, and cooperation model (3C) (Scholten, 2008), is a polycentric response based on lateral coordination (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Helsloot, 2008). In addition to coordinating the response, the CMT plays a major role in communication before, during, and after a crisis. In terms of crisis preparedness, the C2 system focuses on risk assessment based on historical events, the conception of scenario-based emergency planning, training test plans, and procedures. According to Boin, 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (2017), this model is overrated since crises are shaped not only by decisions made by a leader but also by their proper implementation. This top-down decision model is also dependent on the quality of the coordination through the response network. In the response phase, the C2 model concentrates on developing standard operating procedures, strict lines of responsibility, and sectoral approaches, as well as the principle of subsidiarity which holds that a larger and greater body should not exercise functions which can be carried out efficiently by one smaller and lesser, but rather the former should support the latter and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the whole community.

In contrast, in preparation for a crisis, a 3C system risk assessment involves horizon scanning and forward-looking analysis to detect threats, capacity-based planning and network building, agility and adaptability in training, and strategic engagement between centres and the government. In the response phase, 3C systems deploy flexible and multi-purpose CMTs and facilities and use common concepts across agencies to inform leadership with adaptive capacities, which include the management of large-response networks, similar tools, and protocols that can be utilized for different crisis scenarios (Baubion, 2013). Decision-making during a crisis with these multi-disciplinary teams is quite complex, especially in a bureaucratic and political context such as the GOC. It is worth noting that for some researchers, such conditions do not warrant the application of a C2 model during a crisis because members of the team do not work together very often (Devitt & Borodzicz, 2008). Moreover, assuming that members will work toward consensus, unanimity, and solidarity while managing a crisis simply because decisions are made under unified command is unrealistic (Rosenthal, 't Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991).¹

According to one of its senior managers, the GOC is a flexible CMT that could act either as C2 or a 3C model based on the nature of a crisis. This is determined by whether the event in question is of a sudden or unexpected nature (where an organization has more limited control) or a smoldering crisis (a situation that starts out as a small, internal, or contingent event and is made public to stakeholders, hence increasing the possibility of damaged reputations) (Wang & Xi, 2009). According to a GOC senior manager (personal communication, September 29, 2018), "The GOC is a very flexible unit. It is trained to adapt its methods depending on the type of situation and, most importantly, the type of stakeholders involved in the crisis they are dealing with. The C2 model seems to better work with military stakeholders, while the 3C model has proven to be appropriate for civilian stakeholders."

With regard to this case study, the GOC operated within the C2 model. Aside from the nature of the teams, the capacity of the performance of a CMT can be measured through team cognition, which is an overlapping of knowledge shared by the entire team about team members, important team processes, as well as task-specific information. Team cognition pertains to a transactive memory system, including team awareness of what information is unique to each team member, the organization of the information, the team's ability to access the information, and the credibility of the knowledge held by other team members (Fernandez, Shah, Rosenman, Kozlowski, Parker, & Grand, 2017). As per the analysis of reference documents and recollections offered during interviews conducted with GOC's higher management officers, there is no evidence indicating that the GOC went through a team recognition process prior to its management of the shooting on Parliament Hill.

With this in mind, the next section aims to demonstrate that the political decision to launch the GOC did not consider the creation of team cognition using shared mental models, a choice that significantly impacted its capacity to launch efficient strategic communication during the events of October 22.

Shared mental models: An effective crisis management tool

When a crisis strikes, making sense of events is essential, although the unstable nature of the situation can hinder such attempts. It is, therefore, crucial for members of a team to have a shared understanding of events and collectively decide on the appropriate course of action. This is even more important for multidisciplinary teams (Hamilton, Mancuso, Mohammed, Tesler, & McNeese, 2017). A harmonized understanding process is thereby achieved through mental model sharing, which implies that the management of a CMT must move beyond the mere exchange of information to incorporate facts, interpretations, and projection sharing (Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2018).

The sharing of mental models is crucial in the decision-making process in times of crisis. It is a cognitive construction of the behaviour of one or more teams in a sort of pooling, with members sharing their understanding of the facts, interpretations of events, and prioritization of sequential actions. Each individual expresses his or her expectations of other members in order to outline the precise objectives needed to solve the crisis. In crisis situations, the sharing of mental models also facilitates coordination (Su, Kaplan, Burd, Winslow, Hargrove, & Waller, 2017).

The Federal Policy for Emergency Management (FPEM) develops collective terms of reference for the GOC and is designed to harmonize emergency response efforts by the federal and provincial/territorial governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. As far as policy is concerned, the FPEM only requires coordination under the Department of Public Safety in the section dealing with an appropriate response. It also recommends establishing internal structures to provide governance for departmental emergency management activities and making those consistent and interoperable with government-wide emergency management structures. However, there is no evidence in policy documents, such as the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) or *Emergency Management Strategy for Canada: Toward a Resilient 2030*, that mental model sharing is a recommended tool for clarifying understanding and sense making during a crisis event.

Sharing mental models can also improve a team's ability to adapt to a situation, the availability of its members, as well as the operability of its processes in the event of a crisis. Evaluating the quality of mental model sharing leads to the analysis of the positive and negative aspects that affect decision-making during a crisis. For instance, the uncertainty characterized by a lack of strategic and institutional substance can be mitigated by establishing protocols and rules that govern the flow of knowledge about best practices during a crisis (Rentsch, Mello, & Delisle, 2010). The urgency and added pressure of time constraints on the quality of decision-making can be managed by training as well as by mental models of actions that are very precise. The sharing of mental models in a work environment also leads to an adequate identification of potential risks and the most appropriate strategies for managing them (Kapucu, 2012). In addition, the sharing of mental models can be used to assess a team's tolerable stress levels, since the volume of stress is very high during a crisis. As well, the sharing of mental models helps to disseminate and appropriately manage information and build capital in terms of experience (Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). Better than a simple simulation or a drill, this type of sharing also tests the necessary technological supports in a crisis situation and verifies members' ability to use these technologies accordingly.

From the review of documents and interviews, it can be established that the institution in charge of responding to the attack on Parliament Hill did not historically have a common practice of sharing mental models, one of the most important tools to measure how efficient multidisciplinary teams can be. This absence of shared mental models within the crisis response team had a direct impact on the implementation of its communication strategy (Kapucu, 2006). Without a shared understanding of the crisis, the team could not have resolved it effectively.

Though not often used for this purpose, the GCPedia government wiki pages and various forums, such as the GC forums that serve as collective intelligence tools, could be beneficial strategic instruments for sharing mental models. While GCPedia does have modules on crisis communication planning and roadmaps for a CMT, a team leader, and a spokesperson, it is not possible to know who has access to it and who actually uses it. This information should be shared, potentially through the promotion of these Web pages (Banyongen, 2016).

The impact of equivocality on stakeholders

This section outlines the importance of understanding the nature of a crisis and the ramifications associated with communication management during a crisis. One of the main assumptions often made by people assembling a CMT is that the concept of crisis is self-intuitive, self-explanatory, and understood in the same way by all team members. This is not always the case, chiefly because of the polysemy of the aforementioned terminology and the equivocality of crisis-related events. Based on concepts by Boin, 't Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2017), meaning making and sense making are crucial when it comes to making decisions while a crisis is unfolding.

To achieve a clear sense-making during crisis, it is necessary for CMT members to have the same interpretation of events. What researchers have found is that crisis situations are circumstances in which organizations are confronted by a high level of uncertainty and equivocality (Papa, Daniels, & Spiker, 2007). Equivocality is defined as

the possibility and the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations of an organizational case (Coombs, 2015a). Equivocality is connected to communication in a two-way process: first, it has to be reduced through communication and yet, for a CMT to communicate efficiently during a crisis, equivocality has to be largely eliminated. Second, the understanding of a concept such as a crisis within the government depends heavily on the organization's culture, and it calls for more than simply creating a team to eliminate ambiguity.

According to a senior GOC manager (Personal communication, September 28, 2018), the operational alignment seems easier for some stakeholders than others. Indeed not all stakeholders are at the same operational level in terms of their capacity to execute process and strategy during a crisis situation. This is even more challenging since the definition of a concept as a "crisis" has a clear impact on the allocation of resources. The debate at that level does not solely lie in semantics but on the direct implications of the definitions of certain terms. In the case of the shooting on Parliament Hill, labelling the situation as a "terror attack" triggered the deployment of a particular category of resources. It also necessitated coordination between numerous federal agencies and lower jurisdictions, including Public Safety, which was in charge of coordination, Public Works and Government Services (now known as Procurement and Public Services Canada), which is responsible for federal buildings, and the Treasury Board Secretary (TBS), the main employer of civil servants caught in the midst of the shooting. On the municipal level, the City of Ottawa was also involved.

In addition to government organizations, a number of other agencies were directly involved in frontline operations, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Ottawa Police Service, and Parliament Hill security services. Although the FERP clearly states that the overall response to such events must be coordinated by Public Safety Canada through the GOC, the communications section of that response is more difficult to coordinate because each entity has its own communications process, with procedures further affected by competing interests regarding how and when to communicate.

Some context is necessary to better understand the significance of this aspect. The fact that a man well known for his mental instability (Southweick, 2014) was able to trigger chaos and terror in the very heart of the symbolic fortress of Canadian democracy represents a breach of trust between the institutions charged with ensuring public safety and the general public. During a crisis such as this one, the priorities of the political authority (the political party forming the government) conflict with those of the technical authority (governmental departments and agencies) (Kalkman, Pascal, Kerstholt, & Roelofs, 2018), particularly as those priorities relate to each organization's ultimate goal. In other words, each organization faces a different level of responsibility and possible blame for the crisis.

This responsibility factor, which directs the conception and the deployment of these institutions' communications strategies, has been examined through the lens of attribution theory within Situation Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), as outlined by Timothy Coombs (2007, 2015b). Attribution analyzes the causes driving a behaviour or situation through a two-fold process made of an internal part (thinking)

and an external part (talking) (Manusov & Spitzberg, 2008). In a crisis situation, the main focus of attribution is responsibility: people need to know who is responsible for the outcome (Pekrun & Marsh, 2018). Applying Coombs' SCCT approach to this case study, it is 1) a crisis situation, 2) with a range of crisis response strategies, and 3) the stakeholders involved are making choices to match their response strategies to the crisis situation. However, as explained above, the analysis of that situation is far from being based on a consensus. In fact, various government players involved in the situation have a different set of interests in terms of image and reputation, with the result being that even under the same coordination, the crisis may not have the same implications for all players involved. Some government organizations will be seen as responsible, and some will not. The attribution perspective thus highly politicizes the approach to communications during a crisis. This is operationalized by a shift away from building the capacities to manage uncertainty to reinforcing institutional aptitudes for handling blame.

The political context within which this crisis arose is pertinent to the blame-avoidance behaviour tactics employed as the main communications strategy. The shooting took place when the Conservative government in power had instituted cuts to different public service sectors, including security. This was coupled with the pressures of an upcoming federal election. According to Pascal König and Georg Wenzelburger (2014), governments that have made budget cuts in social welfare states follow a reward-punishment logic in their way of dealing with matters because they perceive that voters can hold their policies more accountable. That leads this analysis to the concept of blame avoidance as part of a crisis communication strategy.

Blame avoidance is mostly linked to the political authority in charge of dealing with the crisis. If a crisis is perceived to be the result of specific political programs or processes, stakeholders sometimes focus communications on justification and prioritizing strategies that will help them escape blame (Howlett, 2012). Whether they are politicians or civil servants, it is critical that the situation not be perceived as a failure of the state (Eriksen, 2011), which has an implication on how communication strategies during a crisis are developed. Blame avoidance can even go as far as becoming the main point of reference impacting the choice of words and expressions used to describe the situation.

As per the technical authorities (most of the security institutions involved), the establishment of a coherent communications strategy in the middle of a crisis is often jeopardized by a power struggle that experts refer to as the dialectic of baronies (Renaudin & Altemaire, 2007). This is a path dependency created by the balance of power between members of a CMT. In some cases, when a CMT is created its members already know each other (Watters, 2014), they might have worked together on numerous files over the years. In most cases, the discrepancies related to organizational cultures (expectations, experiences, attitudes, customs, formal and informal rules, values, norms, systems, assumptions, and beliefs) impact the quality of the CMT's functioning (Schein, 2010). These cultural aspects also affect the development of its communications strategy. Within the government, the constitution of a working group such as the GOC is always related to resource distribution. In other words, the amount of effort

required of an organization directly impacts its level of power and the resources allocated to it. This had direct implications on the way in which communication was conducted during and mostly after the shooting.

The first part of this article was dedicated to analyzing internal and structural aspects of the CMT in charge of responding to the Parliament Hill crisis that could have hindered its communication strategy. This section included a description of the National Emergency Response System (NERS), as well as the role assigned to key players. The analysis then narrowed to focus on the nature and functioning of the GOC and highlight the practical difficulties inherent in reaching a common understanding of a crisis among stakeholders and its impact on communications.

Argumentative challenges and media relations during a crisis

The following sections will outline how communication was initiated using media relations as the main factor in analyzing both the tactics employed by the GOC during the crisis and the content of the communication. Despite the increased importance of social media, strategic relations with traditional media outlets are still an essential part of the response phase of a crisis, especially in the wake of a terror attack (Falkheimer, 2014). The assumption is that traditional media still provide the best tools with which to gauge the efficiency of a communications strategy. They represent the main difference between the mere dissemination of information and its rational processing. Traditional media also represent the most important challenge in any attempt to use a persuasive strategy.

Drawing on the interactions that took place between the GOC and the media, this section will assess its communications preparedness and deployment. In terrorism-related crises, emotions remain volatile and provoke unexpected behaviours as well as an increase in conspiracy theories on social media and a general lack of trust and credibility (Aistrope, 2016; Amble, 2012; Conway, 2017). These various elements all impede sense making (Ruggiero, 2017). There is a mounting debate between communication specialists on the ambiguity of the role played by media during a terrorist attack. For some, by showcasing itself in violent and spectacular attacks, terrorism feeds the entertainment industry (Yaméogo, 2018). Media and terrorism are thus engaged in an organic relationship: terrorist attacks are often prepared with media relations in mind since their impact is measured by the echoes produced within public opinion. Therefore, using the media to reframe the discourse on terrorism is valuable.

The role of communication during a terrorist attack

The interaction between the GOC and the media during the press conference following the attack represents the first exteriorization of communications activities, the deployment of the CMT, and clear attempts to persuade. Until that press conference, apart from a few tweets from the RCMP and the Ottawa police warning people to avoid the downtown core, which was the main theatre of operations, the GOC mostly remained behind the curtains.

Press conferences are powerful moments when communicating about a terrorist crisis. They are one of the major weapons in the arsenal of potential responses to the asymmetrical conflict that terrorism represents. Thanks to the temerity and au-

dacity of journalists such as Josh Wingrove and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation/Radio-Canada's camera operators, live coverage of the second part of the attack (which took place within the Parliament) was made available. At the time of the first press conference, what remained lacking was mostly information about what happened and why.

Some context is necessary to showcase the importance of that first press conference for the GOC. The conference took place almost five hours after the first shots were fired. Rumours of numerous shooters had quickly spread across the National Capital Region. This is one of the reasons that a pragma-dialectic approach to assessing the arguments used by the GOC during the press conference remains central to this research. Because of the particularities of this situation, the conference organizers needed to go beyond information diffusion or the mere description of events to truly use arguments that would convey meaning and convince both the media and the public. It was essential for their information to go from simply being known to be believed. Arguments are, therefore, considered in this analysis for their rhetorical value, more specifically as reasoning expressions used in a logical way to resolve the instability that had arisen in the wake of the attack (van Laar & Godden, 2011).

The joint press conference in question was held at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) headquarters in Ottawa by Mayor Jim Watson, Major-General and Deputy Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) Christopher Coates, RCMP Assistant Commissioner Gilles Michaud, and Ottawa Police Chief Charles Bordeleau. The following section focuses on assessing both the semiotic aspects and the content of the argumentation used during that conference, which represents the first attempt on behalf of the GOC to reinstate public trust in its institutions.

The venue

While the RCMP headquarters may seem an appropriate place for a press conference given the security perimeter established in downtown Ottawa, it is nevertheless often advised to hold a crisis press conference as close as possible to the scene of the tragedy (Christensen, Læg Reid, & Rykkja, 2013; May, Workman, & Jones, 2008). This location suggests that authorities have repossessed the area and that it is now secure. The venue of the conference also clearly communicates the fact that the coordination of the event is the responsibility of Public Safety Canada to which the RCMP reports.

The room

In general, one of the underlying principles of a press conference is that all aspects that may attract the camera or the attention of journalists must be managed with particular care. This rudimentary notion is even more important in the wake of a crisis. As a result, the majority of press conferences are held against backgrounds that impart deliberate messaging that reinforces the speakers' statements. The press conference held on October 22, 2014, took place with a black curtain as the background. The speakers were seated around a table covered by a black tablecloth featuring the logo of the RCMP. This impersonal decor was unusual since governmental organizations often use modular walls or backgrounds featuring the Canadian flag, which would have been more suitable. Indeed, decor is an important element contributing to the success

of a press conference, and backdrops are essential components since they figuratively and literately convene key messages as well as reinforce those from the speakers (Leinemann & Baikaltseva, 2016). Further, the Policy on Communication and Federal Identity had some requirements relating to the inclusion of corporate identity and tactile signage in the display that was not respected during that particular conference. The abovementioned policy states:

An institution's visual identity is expressed in many ways and is much broader than corporate identity. The purpose of managing an institution's visual identity is to ensure that corporate goals are visualized and communicated effectively. It is based on the premise that decisions on the design of corporate communications should not be made in isolation. In that sense corporate identity and visual identity have similar objectives. (n.p.)

For journalists accustomed to covering government briefings, these decisions revealed the precipitation and unpreparedness of the event, especially given the fact that the conference occurred more than five hours after the shooting ceased.

The posturo-mimo-gestural: The impact of nonverbal communication

The press conference's four speakers, each from a different organization, were crowded in seats behind a small table. Moreover, no signs or displays identified the speakers explicitly. This lack of organization caused some confusion at the beginning of the conference as Mayor Watson was unsure of where to sit. The master of ceremonies remedied the issue by making it his duty to name each individual by title before they spoke. Nevertheless, in such a grave and continuously evolving situation, having the speakers seated sent the wrong message. When every image has symbolic value, sitting gives an impression of weariness, which increases the perception that the individuals are overwhelmed by events (Josh Wingrove, personal communication, May 15, 2015).

This conference lasted only 20 minutes, but the impression of annoyance was quite apparent, especially from the Assistant Commissioner Michaud. He could be spotted looking at his watch, and after only 16 minutes he leaned toward the moderator and used a non-verbal gesture requesting to end the conference. In addition, his shifting glances and lack of eye contact did not help convey the messages positively. This paralanguage is important because 75 percent of trust in a crisis comes from non-verbal cues, namely the movements of one's hands and eyes and one's posture (Covello, 2007). Much of the body language that could be observed and the discomfort of the speakers were in clear contradiction with the main point of the press conference, which was that security forces were well-prepared for such situations. Furthermore, there were moments during the conference when two speakers (Commissioner Michaud and Chief of Police Bordeleau) were unsure of who was supposed to answer certain questions posed by a journalist, which came across as rather awkward. Overall, it can be argued that these oversights extend beyond unpreparedness and highlight the challenges of collaboration between different organizations within the GOC.

Roles and responsibilities

In theory, having four speakers can demonstrate solidarity across the organizations

managing a crisis, but in practice, this was not effective. First, the limited space around the table signalled that there were too many speakers, and this was only confirmed during the press conference itself since the Media advisory didn't mention all of them. Second, two speakers offered condolences to the soldier's family but provided no details on his identity. In his opening remarks, Mayor Jim Watson called it a sad and tragic day for Ottawa, "I'm sure I speak for all residents of our city when I extend my heartfelt condolences to the family of the individual who lost his life this morning while standing guard at the National War Memorial at the heart of downtown Ottawa."² Major-General Christopher Coates said, "Our thoughts are with the member and the member's family at this time."³

It is understandable that as the main political officer in charge of the city under fire, Mayor Watson sought to express his condolences and portray an image of compassion to his constituents. While this courtesy may seem important, the point could have been made in press releases or social media posts; this was a moment for mainly security concerns. On a related point, the death of a soldier may justify the presence of Major-General Coates, except that in this situation, the evolution of crisis operations was the central concern, and Coates was not central to that effort. The City of Ottawa was indeed already represented by the chief of police, and since the military did not have operational competence on the national territory, the presence of the Major-General Coates did not add informational value.

The desire to have all segments of the GOC represented at the press conference could also be construed as evidence that each individual wanted his interpretation of the situation to be heard, suggesting that the CMT had not developed one interpretation of the crisis. Regardless of whether a CMT is acting under a C2 or a 3C approach, rallying around the spokesperson or around the team leader at the first press conference is essential. In other crises, this has been symbolized by physically surrounding the spokesperson during his or her performance. In fact, appointing a spokesperson when a crisis strikes is one of the first recommended moves (Marconi, 2004), since it becomes challenging to deliver a coherent message when several individuals speak. This is further intensified in a situation when attention spans are limited and strong emotions may inhibit persuasiveness.

Assessing press conference content: The fallacy of persuasion

During a crisis press conference, messages are usually articulated around the need to restore trust. Since an event such as a shooting damages the relationship between institutions and the public, the press conference aims to recreate a bond of trust. According to Debra Noumair and Abraham Shani (2016), trust must, first of all, be restored within an organization, in this case, the GOC, as well as with its leadership. A number of principles are essential to a crisis-related press conference, with the first being the cardinal principle of truth. It is recommended that even if not all available information is divulged to the media, the facts that are provided to journalists are true at the moment when statements are made (Seymour & Moore, 2000).

Since the press conference took place when it remained unclear to journalists and to the general public if the shooting involved more than one attacker, the conference was a prime opportunity to steal the thunder (Fowler, 2017), thereby quashing ru-

mours and speculation. In most crises, this approach would require communication by a prominent organization or politician to ensure that the information received intensified media attention. By doing so, the crisis management team would ensure that they owned the narrative. In this situation, however, the press conference took place after the attacker was shot dead, and even though investigations were still underway, the GOC had information that strongly implied Michael Zehaf-Bibeau was a lone wolf. For Josh Wingrove (personal communication, May 15, 2015), a *Globe and Mail* journalist, “This press conference left journalists with more questions than answers. Worse, most of the journalists at Parliament Hill have learned more detail on the attack from American journalists using information from the FBI.” The power of the conference was reduced by failing to clarify that important detail. The hesitation to answer essential questions about events and, more importantly, about the next steps—a common problem identified in research by James Lukazewski (2013)—was one of the main errors made during the crisis conference.

Team culture is an indicator of productive capacity under pressure. When it is present, it contributes to a working ethos and norms that support a clear distribution of power, solid communications patterns, and straightforward orientation to stakeholders (Hayes & Wooten, 2010). In this case, however, three main questions lingered after the press conference: 1) Were there multiple shooters? 2) How was it decided that military personnel should stay out of uniform when off-duty and when would that decision be withdrawn? 3) When would the lockdown come to an end? Not one of these issues was adequately addressed during the press conference. Actually, it was quite difficult to pinpoint the main message of the conference, and even some journalists in attendance were hard-pressed to recall the take-home messages (D. Tandt, 2014).

According to experts, in a crisis situation practitioners ought to work with media as partners (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007; Veil & Ojeda, 2010), but only a solid team with the same understanding of the situation will be successful in creating this kind of partnership. For the Parliament Hill attack, this was one of the most important requirements since special precautions needed to be taken to announce the death of the fallen soldier to the family. This sort of partnership is also essential when engaging with the media about interacting with the family in order to respect their privacy. Before launching a press conference and interacting with media during a crisis, it is essential that the CMT recognizes that the event has created an information vacuum the press conference must fill.

Speakers at this conference conveyed two main points: they did not have information concerning the inquiry and they would not release any information concerning the attacker or the victim. With regard to the latter, they primarily used a circular argument as an approach. In the same vein as begging the question fallacy that occurs when an argument’s premise assumes the truth of the conclusion (Douglas Walton, 1994). A prime example took place when Commissioner Michaud and the chief of police reiterated to a journalist that information about an ongoing investigation would not be disclosed. “At this stage, we will not disclose any information related to the investigation,” said Commissioner Michaud during the press conference, following the shooting on the Hill on October 22, 2014. In so doing, they properly deployed the *I don’t*

know template (IDK) as outlined by Covello (2011), which consists of repeating the question (without its negative aspects) and explaining to the reporter that you would like to answer certain questions, but that your ability is limited by the circumstances. The speakers did exactly that and, in most cases, they promised to provide answers as soon as they had them.

That being said, the circular argument was only applied during the conference once an authority argument fell short. Indeed, Commissioner Michaud began his speech by explaining that they remained prepared for such events. He commented that Canadian security services often practiced similar scenarios to be ready for such a situation. This type of argumentation, called an “appeal to authority,” (Douglas Walton, Christopher Reed, & Fabrizio Macagno, 2008), relies on presenting the speaker as having the expertise to deal with the issues under discussion in an efficient and appropriate manner. However, the argument was ineffective because it did not coincide with the facts the GOC did not seem to have this under control—and also because the rest of the conference demonstrated a lack of shared mental models within the team. In other words, if all team members shared the same facts, interpretations, and projections, a single speaker surrounded by representatives from other agencies would have been sufficient. The authority argument would have been better supported by the anticipate, prepare, practice (APP) model of message mapping developed by Randall Hyer and Vincent Covello (2017). Using this model would have prompted the development of a frequently asked questions (FAQ) document with up to three key messages with precise evidence for each response. Instead, no real supporting facts were disclosed during the press conference. It is important to note that even when the authority argument is used (by trained and experienced security officers handling the situation), it must be underpinned by supporting facts such as statistics, anecdotal evidence, quotes, or illustrations, which provide added value to the structure of proof being presented. Simply relying on authority to instill belief is simply not enough in a crisis situation.

Given that the conference was held during an unstable time, with people on lockdown in most downtown government buildings, one of the main objectives should have been to provide guidance and encourage appropriate attitudes and behaviours. Communication during a crisis is dedicated to building trust through participation in the decision-making process (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2010). By speaking with the media, the GOC was aiming to move beyond informing the population to providing those that were still trapped with instructional messages to help them avoid harm in the midst of the turmoil. In that regard, crisis communication researchers have developed a standard and general-purpose model to follow when providing populations with instructional messages. This model, consisting of four main elements—internalization, distribution, explanation, and action (IDEA) is designed to guide a CMT to produce effective messaging that increases cognitive understanding and behavioural intentions for those experiencing a crisis (Sellnow, Lane, Sellnow, & Littlefield, 2017). During the press conference, panelists were asked to comment on the mindset people should adopt moving forward and if there were instructions that should be followed given that the situation had not yet been normalized. They re-

peated that a security perimeter had been established and that people should stay as far away as possible from the downtown core, information that had already been tweeted by the RCMP and the Ottawa Police Service. It was perhaps more urgent at that moment to ensure that those who remained in the lockdown had reliable information they could understand and reclaim, a process known as the power of personalization (Lindell, 2013; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990). Journalist Josh Wingrove (Personal communication, May 15, 2015) argued that “As a consequence of this lack of clarity, people who were on lockdown and who followed the press conference through social media or on TV felt left behind as they had more questions than answers by the end.”

An assessment of the discursive content of the press conference provides more evidence of a clear lack of coordination among the response team. Their discursive approach was not mindful of the mental noise model, a key aspect in crisis communication that indicates how people respond emotionally to perceived danger (Sandman, 1993; Slovic, 1992). The efficient development of instructional messages that take into consideration all the elements of the IDEA learning cycle model provides additional evidence of a CMT that has mastered shared mental models and has the same understanding of the facts (Sellnow & Sellnow, 2014). However, the messages were complicated by the fact that the Department of National Defense, which teamed up with the GOC during the crisis, had protocol concerns regarding the announcement of a military kill in action (KIA). “That attack made the communication process further complicated because while the KIA protocol is well-established and has been used several times abroad, its use on Canadian soil was still limited and not fully understood by all parties concerned” explained a senior public affairs officer at the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC-DND) (Personal communication, September 21, 2018).

By analyzing the format and the content of the press conference held by GOC, functioning as a CMT, after the attack while the situation was still unclear, this section establishes that the panelists did provide what little information was at their disposal while also explaining the restrictions they had on providing additional details to the media. However, the lack of shared mental models, as well as differing interpretations of facts, situations, and risk analysis based on organizational interests, impeded the CMT’s capacity to develop instructional messages.

The GOC’s dialectic of baronies in media coverage

This section deals with the perception of the GOC team within the media after the crisis. It displays how old quarrels and disputes about the allocation of resources between different stakeholders, such as the RCMP and the parliamentary security guard, were portrayed within the media after the crisis.

Once the crisis was over, a new battle ensued between two main stakeholders of the CMT, the RCMP and the parliamentary security guards, and as tensions spilled over, the disagreement garnered media coverage. Even if the debates were focused on security issues, the post-crisis management had to be related to communication. In fact, right after the crisis ended, the media reported that a rampant disagreement between the RCMP and the parliamentary security guards had erupted. To contextualize the new type of crisis that emerged, some history about the management of security forces on Parliament Hill is helpful. Before the crisis, four main security services were

in charge of the Parliament Buildings. The Parliamentary Protective Services (PPS) guarded the House of Commons; the Senate Security Service was in charge of the Senate building, although the RCMP managed personal security within those buildings; and the exterior surrounding these buildings was under the purview of the Ottawa Police Service. This complicated configuration is conducive to an environment favouring a dialectic of baronies, which is the unexpected return of old quarrels. Stakeholders have a history before the crisis that can impact the confidence they have in each other during and after the crisis (Renaudin, 2004).

To make matters worse, this complicated configuration of security management was modified after the crisis. The government presented a motion to Parliament demanding to put all Parliament security under RCMP supervision. The same motion also requested that the RCMP ensure the prime minister's security when he was in Parliament. The House of Commons Protective Service Association, which represents the security officers on Parliament Hill, immediately reacted, informing the media that this decision was iniquitous because it was a breach of tradition and it jeopardized public perception of the independence of these security services (Radio-Canada, 2015).

Subsequently, the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS) was created in 2015 in response to the crisis. The PPS combines the former House of Commons and Senate Security Services. It is comprised of two main groups: protective officers inside the buildings who carry weapons and detection officers who screen vehicles and visitors prior to entry into the Parliament. The post-crisis conflict situation that surfaced within the media was even more delicate since the House of Commons and Senate security forces considered themselves to be heroes during the attack. Indeed, it was one of their members, Kevin Vickers, a former RCMP agent and Parliament's sergeant-at-arms at the time, who emerged as a hero by gunning down the attacker (Leblanc, 2017).

While post-crisis communication should be dedicated to image renewal (Ulmer et al., 2008) and restorative rhetoric (Thompson, Jerome, Payne, Mayer, Kirby, & Pfohl, 2017), quarrels among stakeholders occupied the news in the aftermath of the crisis. The latest example took place as recently as August 2018, in an article by CBC journalist Dean Beeby (2018) that detailed a billing dispute between the PPS and the RCMP regarding two million dollars' worth of additional charges. Over four years after the crisis, the opportunity had largely been squandered to show organizational growth and rebuild lost trust with the public by providing evidence that the agency had learned its lesson and made improvements.

The management of the post-crisis period is critical. In general, crises often create opportunities for growth that are imperceptible in a normal state of affairs. These events make it possible to learn, make strategic changes, and gain a competitive advantage. In Mandarin, the characters representing the word "crisis" translate to "a dangerous opportunity" (Coombs, 2006). Indeed, after the crisis and the press conference, the population rallied behind the politicians who projected a united face. ABC News (2014) described how Parliament stood together as one after the attack. In fact, the rebuilding of a united front that was displayed during this period created a wave of sympathy that linked the organizations and the victims. This kind of situation is effective in restoring positive perceptions toward an organization (Coombs, 2015b; Kiambi &

Schafer, 2016). Moreover, in this case, Parliament was not just offering compassionate condolences, it was actually on the receiving end of much sympathy. This is often the case after an attack believed to be of a terrorist nature, as people feel the need to support the organization under attack. Even if the attribution of responsibility process (Coombs & Holladay, 1996) would inevitably begin, the media remained reluctant to assign blame.

A post-mortem and a lessons-learned session were held. In some cases, the Ottawa Police Service and the RCMP commissioned reports from third parties, such as the one published on June 3, 2015, by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP, 2015). The RCMP also produced an internal report that outlined their shortcomings concerning the management of security. Nevertheless, the deployment of communications strategies does not appear to have been properly assessed, and if it was, according to a senior manager of the GOC (Personal communication, September 29, 2018), the document remains classified. Without this knowledge, there is no evidence that communications would be better managed today than on October 22, 2014, if a similar attack were to occur.

Conclusion

When it comes to terrorism, it is often said that the sites that will be targeted remain unknown, but that attacks or attempts will certainly take place. At the time of the shooting in 2014, the global threat of terrorism in large urban centres around the world was already commonplace. By developing a plan to combat terrorism in 2011, the Government of Canada wanted to be ready. While the creation of the Government Operations Centre is evidence of that preparation, the government was nevertheless ill-prepared to face a crisis of this magnitude and more importantly, it did not have the proper strategies in place to effectively communicate.

This article accessed the communication processes around the crisis that occurred on Parliament Hill on October 22, 2014. It asserts that the constitution and the functioning of the CMT impacted its ability to communicate effectively. Conducted with an analysis of GOC reference documents coupled with semi-directed interviews, this case study demonstrates that members of the CMT assigned to mitigate the crisis did not share the same interpretation of events due to a lack of shared mental models, an issue that could have been addressed before the crisis. Communication approaches during the crisis are evaluated through media relations and particularly through the first press conference organized after the shooting. Interaction with media only accentuated the GOC's difficulties in developing a cohesive argument that could have led them to steal the thunder from the rumours that were circulating. Through assessment of media coverage, this article demonstrates that the GOC's press conference also fell short in providing instructional messages that would have helped those individuals under lockdown to adopt secure behaviours. The insufficient communication during the post-crisis period analyzed through a short media coverage assessment as well as semi-directed interviews also allowed the dissension within the CMT to be scrutinized by the media. As a result, the crisis remained in the spotlight numerous years after its conclusion.

Since the case study that provides the foundation of this research is associated with a singular situation, the problem of the external validity of this work must be ad-

dressed. In other words, this is the possibility of generalizing the particular case observed here to apply to other cases. The complex nature of this crisis connects elements that do not have a cause-and-effect relationship, and thus, this case study contributes to an understanding of a type of situation that remains largely unexamined (Cutler, 2004; Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). This study demonstrates that a crisis needs to be analyzed using a chronological sequence (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis) for a better comprehension of communications. Researchers have also shown how restorative rhetoric may enable leaders to reduce trauma using social media (Williams, Woods, & Staricek, 2017). While this study has solely focused on traditional media during and after a crisis, further study of the GOC's use of social media and its reception by the public would allow for further understanding of the impact of its communication on public perception during this crisis.

Notes

1. Research on the efficiency of medical teams has led to the development of a concept known as the Team Emergency Assessment Measure (TEAM), which helps to identify key indicators that enable standardized performance assessment and also help to structure team debriefings. The TEAM model could be put to good use when it comes to the assessment of a CMT even in a non-medical context. This statistical measurement tool primarily focuses on the relationship between teamwork, leadership, and task management (Cooper, Cant, Connell, Sims, Potter, Symmons, Nestel, & Liaw, 2016).
2. Mayor Jim Watson during the press conference following the shooting on the Hill on October 22, 2014.
3. Major-General Christopher Coates during the press conference following the shooting on the Hill on October 22, 2014.

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