National Culture: A Contradiction in Terms?

Richard Collins (Goldsmiths' College, University of London)

Abstract: There is no necessary congruence between the frontiers of states and those of cultural communities, positive consequences can follow (and in the case of U.K. television have followed) from the transnationalization of television and that the integrity and survival of states is less strongly linked to cultural sovereignty and the maintenence of national culture than is often supposed.

Résumé: Il n'y a pas de congruence nécessaire entre les frontières des Etats et celles des communautés culturelles. Des conséquences positives peuvent résulter (par exemple, dans le cas suivi par la télévision du Royaume-Uni) d'une transnationalisation de la télévision. L'intégrité et la survivance des Etats n'est pas relié aussi étroitement, comme on le suppose généralement, à la souveraineté culturelle et au maintien d'une culture nationale.

More and more television is becoming transnationalized under the influence of, sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, economic and political forces. Audiences' expectations are ratcheted up as they are exposed to high budget productions. Accordingly higher and higher program costs must be amortized in larger and larger markets which increasingly cross national boundaries. Economic pressures leading to transnationalization are matched by political pressures; including the efforts of European institutions, such as the European Commission, which seek greater economic and/or political integration between hitherto separate and sovereign states. The single European market in goods and services including television (by 1992) is but one, albeit the most ambitious and comprehensive, integrative project (see inter alia Commission of the European Communities, 1984, and Schwartz, 1985). The transnationalization of culture is both a cause and a consequence of the political and economic processes of transnationalization.

The notion "national culture" is both a central organizing category in the shaping of economic and cultural production, and a mystifying category error. The term "national culture" fits the reality of television less and less, though it signifies an important goal in the past and in a programmatic and "scaled up" version promises to do so in the future. For the creation of a single European market (to some at least) is conditional on the creation of a "European nation." A political and economic unit, which will need its own shared culture to unify the new community and separate it from others. Implicit already are the problems. In the old Europe of nation states there was (and is) no symmetry between political institutions and nations, or between "culture" and political institutions. Both advocates of a European nation, such as Jacques Delors, and those who resist it, notably Margaret Thatcher, ground their arguments in similar nationalist precepts and demand that culture and political institutions be isomorphic. This ideology of nationalism centres on the belief that there are "natural" communities sharing ethnicity, location, history, belief, language and economic interest that "naturally" should enjoy political sovereignty in a "nation state." And that nation-states are the only building blocks from which a stable and productive political order can be built.

Nationalism is self-evidently a powerful force and a concept with real analytical power, but it is not the only form in which human sociality is expressed and realized nor necessarily the best conceptual basis for understanding the contemporary politics, culture and economics of television. I believe it makes more sense to decouple policy from culture, to recognize the undoubted existence of national communities and the power of patriotic sentiment but not to accept that such communities and sentiments are either necessary or optimal.

Co-productions are becoming an increasingly important form of internationalization of television program content. Television Business International (October 1989, pp. 127-134) lists 442 co-productions in progress, or recently completed, in October 1989. Co-productions reflect both economic and political pressures for collaboration in production between partners of different nationalities. Drama is the highest cost television program form and therefore the point at which economic pressures making for internationalization are likely to be most acutely experienced. Yet although economic and political imperatives may occasion increasing numbers of international co-productions a successful co-production must satisfy essentially cultural criteria; it must please different audiences which often have few assumptions and cultural reflexes in common. Most co-productions are therefore between partners in a single international language community. Of the 82 U.K. co-productions listed by Television Business International, only 18 included non-anglophone partners and of these only 10 were with exclusively non-English-speaking partners. (Many co-productions between Canada and France are shot in English). It is in such products that a successful "internationalization" of content has become most evident. However successful co-productions depend on the program subject pleasing audiences in all the markets which the co-production partners serve.

Opportunities to co-produce are limited when the aspirant partners come from, and are making products for, markets where target viewers have little historical experience and few cultural reference points in common. Moreover anglophone audiences seem particularly resistant to consumption of programming made in languages other than English. United States viewers are notorious for their intolerance of exogenous programming (hence the extraordinarily low percentage of foreign programs on U.S. screens detected by Varis, 1974 and 1984) and U.K. audiences, women in particular, resist dubbed and subtitled programs. Hence the long history of co-production between anglophone partners and between the United Kingdom and the United States in particular. However there are increasingly strong political forces in contemporary Western Europe which promote co-productions between production partners drawn from distinct language communities. A striking example is Channel 4's participation in the European Co-production Association which was established in 1985 as a vehicle for collaboration in production between European public broadcasters (see Ungureit, 1988). The Production Association's most notable fruit was the Eurocop sextuplets (screened in 1988), the first of a series of planned drama initiatives in which Channel 4 (U.K.), RAI (Italy), ORF (Austria), ZDF (West Germany), Antenne 2 (France), SRG (Switzerland) and latterly RTVE (Spain) have collaborated. The aims of the Production Association are:

the long term making and exploiting of joint productions by the contracting partners, and especially long running drama series, in the television field. The programs made by the production association are to deal with European subjects, to make known the European culture of the past, present and future and, last but not least, to contribute to the presentation and reinforcement of the artistic and production related infrastructure in European countries. (Ungureit, 1988, p. 17)

The Association committed 22.7m to approximately 50 hours of programs (Financial Times, March 17, 1988, p. 2); an average budget of 450,000 per hour--high for drama production in Europe. But even though the U.K. participant, Channel 4, contributed only one-fifth of this budget its costs were high in relation to the channel's average cost of programming (in 1986, circa 24,000, rising in 1988 to 26,500 and declining in 1989 to 25,700 per hour) and to the cost of programming it acquires off the shelf. However though collaboration on Eurocops successfully reduced the cost per hour of drama programming of the co-production partners evaluation of the project's success requires that viewers' response be considered.

It is hard to compare sensibly the reception of Eurocops programs in different West European television markets. Programs were shown on different days and at different times and against different alternative viewing possibilities by each of the six partners. (And Swiss television did not screen the French episode of Eurocops). Moreover viewing figures in some markets are expressed in terms of ratings (the average percentage of all individuals with a television receiver who watched) and in terms of share in others (the proportion of viewers who watched). However it is clear that fewer viewers in the U.K. than in France or Italy watched Eurocops. The U.K. episode Hunting the Squirrel achieved a U.K. rating of 4%, a French rating of 12.1%, and an Italian share of 19.75%. The French episode Rapt à Paris (Kidnapping in Paris) scored a U.K. rating of 4%, a French rating of 11.1% and an Italian share of 25.68%. (Figures for Switzerland, Germany and Austria are incomplete.) The viewing figures (albeit incomplete and imperfectly comparable) suggest that U.K. viewers are less disposed than are other European television viewers to watch television from other European producers; although the U.K. episode of Eurocops scored a lower U.K. rating than did the Austrian episode Die Bestie vom Bisamberg (The Bisamberg Beast). Ungureit (Deputy Director of Programs for ZDF, the West German participant in the Production Association) recognizes that the dramas made by the Association embody a contradictory relationship between producers' aspirations to reduce costs and make "European" programming, and audiences' desires for entertainment. He states:

Common to all is the intention to stress European values; this primarily concerns the traditions of non-standardized, non-levelled narrative form. It is quite obvious that this contains material for conflict if popular programs are to be made (Ungureit, 1988, p. 20).

As well as the pervasive economic rationale for co-production which is internationalizing television programming, there are strong political forces which are shaping television in Western Europe. The European Commission and the Council of Europe are promoting a transnational "European Culture" as a defensive response to the transnational culture of the television market place. The alarm voiced in the Community and Council can cynically be regarded as the result of manoeuvering by European producer interests and cultural elites as their assured markets and hegemony are threatened. Such alarm is directly proportional to the attractiveness of the foreign offerings to European television audiences whose viewing of national programming could formerly, during the long heyday of national broadcasting sovereignty, be taken for granted. But whether or not one finally wishes to make such cynical judgments it is important to recognize that there is an alternative (non-exclusive) explanation for the concern succinctly articulated by Jack Lang (Minister of Culture of France) that "coca-cola satellites are attacking our artistic and cultural integrity" (Financial Times April 30, 1984, p. 3).

Lang's concern is classically nationalist. Nationalism, the "foremost ideology of the modern world" (Minogue, 1967, p. 6) is a belief that human societies should be organized in politically sovereign states populated by a single nation. The nation is in turn defined as a spontaneous association of humans bound together by shared language, culture, ethnicity and beliefs. Nationalist theory stipulates a normative congruence of political institutions, economic activity and cultural identity and experience. Without such congruence, nationalists tend to believe, communities are unstable and their members are denied their patrimony of feeling "at home." It is a belief which, as Gellner states, strives "to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof and not more than one roof at that" (Gellner, 1983, p. 43).

Clearly such ideas are, and have long been, very powerful. But equally clearly many human societies have not been of this kind. Nationalism is an ideology under pressure as the world economy becomes more integrated and interdependent and the economic self sufficiency of nation states is less and less easy to sustain. Politics and economics are becoming decoupled and political institutions (states) exercise authority ever more precariously over economic activities which increasingly escape their grasp. Politics and culture are similarly being decoupled, though concern at this rupture tends not to focus on the long-established international high culture where authors and audiences share no common citizenship. The international circulation of Mozart, Poussin, Borges, Tolstoy troubles few. What is troubling is the internationalization of mass culture and hence the consequential imputed threat to national identity and the stability of the political institutions and systems which are assumed to rest on it. Attempts to keep "polity and culture" congruent are largely confined to mass culture.

The cost/revenue pressures that lead to co-production also lead to extensive purchasing of programming in the international marketplace. The dynamics of this international trade are well known and are based on the low marginal cost of reproduction of film and television programs and the ability of producers in large and prosperous markets (notably the U.S.A) to recoup costs in home markets. Television programs, one instance of internationally traded information products, are marked by intrinsic characteristics which limit their international circulation, of which language and, to a lesser extent, culture are the most important. Information, though a product with potentially very low marginal costs of production and indestructible in consumption (and therefore a product which returns more than proportional rises in profits as consumption increases, thus giving producers powerful incentives to extend their markets geographically) is not universally consumable. Linguistic and cultural barriers limit the extension of information markets in ways that textile, grain, steel and many manufactured product markets are not. In information markets there is a particularly sharp contradiction between the potentiality to profit from low marginal costs of production through extension of markets in time and space and consumer resistance to products which are incomprehensible (because in an unknown language) or are "culturally" unfamiliar and unwelcome. Producers therefore experience very strong incentives to make products which are as widely acceptable as possible. In so doing not all producers are equally advantaged; those who work in English enjoy enormous advantages. For not only do anglophones form the largest (excluding non-market economies of which the Chinese and Russian linguistic communities are the most important) world language community (and the richest) but English is also the dominant second language of the world.

The size and wealth of the anglophone market provides producers of English-language information with a considerable comparative advantage vis-à-vis producers in other languages. But it is important to recognize that this advantage is a potential advantage which may or may not be realizable. Not all anglophone producers will succeed, and producers in other languages are not necessarily doomed to fail. Within the anglophone TV drama market a fairly stable division of labour has taken place with U.S. producers making high-cost melodramas, Australia moderately-budgeted soaps and British producers high-budget costume drama. Success is neither inevitable or permanent but the anglophone market is sufficiently large for such specialization to take place. Such opportunities are denied to producers in smaller and poorer language communities who are faced with competing against the anglophone products--the costs of which have usually been fully recouped in the English-language market--which are available for profitable sale into other language markets at little more than marginal cost (see inter alia Collins, 1986, and Hoskins, Mirus, and Rozeboom, 1989).

Moreover anglophone consumers tend to be less inclined to consume non-English-language products than are non-anglophones to consume English-language products. However language is not the only factor which conditions market structure and promotes, or inhibits, the circulation of information. Hoskins and Mirus (1988) have coined the useful term "cultural discount" to refer to the loss of attractiveness or usefulness when information is marketed to consumers to whose cultural experience it is alien. "Cultural discount" varys depending on the proximity of producers and consumers and obtains within as well as between states. Thus a "cultural discount" obtains when Tutti Frutti is consumed by U.K. television viewers unfamiliar with the topography of Glasgow, the accents of Central Scotland and the music of the sixties. And when viewers and producers are separated by social class, Richards cites the World Film News survey published in 1937 to suggest that a higher "cultural discount" applied between British working-class cinema audiences and British films than between those audiences and American films. That is, the notionally national culture of Britain was weaker than the transnational culture which bound working-class British audiences into a North Atlantic culture. Exhibitors in working-class areas, Richards argues, were

on the whole satisfied with the more vigorous American films...(but) practically unanimous in regarding the majority of British films as unsuitable for their audiences. British films, one Scottish exhibitor writes, should rather be called English films in a particularly parochial sense; they are more foreign to his audience than the products of Hollywood, over 6000 miles away. (Richards, 1984, p. 24)

The continued attractiveness of American audiovisual works to U.K. audiences was amply demonstrated by the BBC's dramatic loss of audience to commercial television in the late 1950s. Commercial television not only showed North American programming, used North American formats and performers but had the vitality and vigour that the 1930s cinema exhibitors identified as an attraction of American films for their audiences. Analogous patterns of audience "leakage" away from the national programming diet provided by the state public broadcaster to competing American (or, when not produced in the U.S.A, American-type) programming can be seen elsewhere in Europe. One of the outstanding achievements of U.S. cinema and television has been to develop programming which reduces "cultural discount." Clearly anglophone producers do enjoy a potential comparative advantage (and U.S. producers in particular are advantaged) over competitors because of the characteristics of the English-language market. But such advantages are potential advantages, their realization depends on a number of factors, not least their style and content of cultural products. European audiences' taste for American programming suggests that cultural communities are constituted as often horizontally, across national boundaries, as they are constituted vertically, within national boundaries.

Various attempts have been made to account for the international attractiveness of American film and television. Bordwell, Staiger, & Thompson (1985) argue rightly that "a distinct and homogeneous style has dominated American studio filmmaking" (p. 3). How and why this "distinct and homogeneous style" developed, its relation to the economic structure of the mass entertainment industry, and the reasons for its attractiveness to audiences has become an important focus for the attention of scholars. Among the factors that have contributed to the success of American producers is the profit-maximizing orientation of American producers which necessitated gratifying audiences. The variety of populations immersed in the melting pot of the United States gave U.S. producers a kind of microcosm of the developed world's population as a home market. And the experience and values of the U.S.A have long had a magnetic appeal outside its territories. The appeal of the American audio-visual media has long cut horizontally across the world audience. The United States film and television industries owe their dominance of world audio-visual trades not only to market power, the machinations of Will Hays and Jack Valenti and to the comparative advantage of working in the biggest and richest of the world's language communities but also to their invention of a cultural form that is the closest to trans-national acceptability of any yet contrived. As de Sola Pool put it: "The Americanization of world culture so often commented on and deplored might be better described as the discovery of what world cultural tastes actually are" (de Sola Pool, 1975).

But such restratifications of national culture communities separate elite from mass or popular taste and threaten the cultural hegemony enjoyed by national cultural elites (a hegemony that paradoxically is often based on a privileged familiarity with a high culture no more national than the "coca-cola" culture of the masses). New or exogenous cultural forms restratify communities. Insiders whose "cultural capital" is invested in the old have an interest in resisting such changes. Insiders are unlikely to innovate, and where barriers to new market entrants exist, latent consumer demand may be left unsatisfied. The history of broadcasting in the U.K. is replete with examples of such a situation. British broadcasting has been more subject to competitive pressures than have been other West European systems. It is too easily forgotten that the U.K. had the first competitive television system in Europe and the first financed (in part) by advertising. Within this system there was--at times--an extraordinarily fruitful synthesis between the popular and the elite; a conjunction which was particularly evident in the BBC during the late 1950s and early 1960s when it adapted its programming to win back the audiences lost to commercial television, "Americanization" did not only manifest itself in programming (77 Sunset Strip, Dragnet) and formats (Take Your Pick, The $64,000 Question) which U.K. broadcasters (including the BBC) imported from North America but also in adoption of "American" working practices. In a division of labour in production which led to what, hyperbolically, could be called the death of the author. The personnel and professional orientation of U.K. broadcasters during television's "Golden Age" of TV Drama (which followed the doubling of channel capacity and introduction of competition in the 1950s) was similarly "Americanized."

The BBC purchased 35 dramas from CBC in Canada and hired the executive producer behind them, Sydney Newman. Newman, and the dramas he had developed in Canada, were attractive to the BBC because the competition from ITV which faced the BBC found a model. Newman's legacy was complex but central to it was his orientation to the popular. His assumption was that: "The cost of art in our kind of society has to be in relation to the number of people whose imagination it will excite" (Newman interviewed in Cinema Canada, no. 15, 1974). Such priorities were very different to those which prevailed in the BBC before it was exposed to competition. Val Gielgud, the head of BBC TV drama from 1949-52 (and the effective head of BBC radio drama since 1929), found the BBC's radio soap Mrs Dale's Diary "socially corrupting by its monstrous flattery of the ego of the `common man' and soul destroying to the actors, authors and producers concerned" (cited in Briggs, 1979, p. 699).

Two points follow from this account. First, the media culture of the U.K. is one that has long been synthetic and appropriational. Second, it has been horizontally stratified with a powerful connection between subordinate classes and consumption of "American" (whether or not "Made in the U.S.A.") information products. This suggests that national culture is, if not a category error, at least a misleading concept if the dynamics of such processes are to be captured and understood. But there are important qualifications to be entered. First, the patterns of synthesis and appropriation performed in "British" culture are strongly inflected by language. London is much closer to New York and New Zealand than it is to Paris. And, second, television viewing is strongly skewed towards British programs. It is seldom that U.S. (let alone other foreign programs) material rises above eighth or tenth in the ratings. Dutch television has similar features (see inter alia Ang, 1985, and Bekkers, 1987, for perceptive overviews). In spite of increasing access to transnational television whether delivered by satellite or terrestrial transmissions, Dutch audiences prefer programs and services of Dutch origin. "Anything made in the Netherlands is always very popular. Dutch products always draw more viewers than similar products from abroad" (Bekkers, 1987, p. 34).

Numerous commentators have argued that Canada pre-echoes the future of European television (see inter alia Collins, 1982, Gerlach, 1988, and Juneau, 1984). Canada is invoked to exemplify the threat of the United States and the baleful consequences that attend loss of communication sovereignty and the absence of congruence between culture and polity which, it is assumed, inevitably obtains when more foreign than domestic television is viewed. CBC stated in its evidence to the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy that "There can be no political sovereignty without cultural sovereignty" (CBC, 1985, p. 9). Palpably there can be as the case of Canada demonstrates. Since the inception of broadcasting in North America in 1920 (XWA in Montreal and KDKA in Pittsburgh began regular broadcasts within a month of each other) Canadians have consumed large quantities of American radio and television, far more than either Canadian language community consumes of the programming of the other Canadian language group. And as Hetu and Renaud (1987) point out there is little "amphibious" programming scheduled to both communities (still less that is extensively watched by both) or that represents each to the other. Yet Canada holds together remarkably well. There is no evidence that it is becoming a 51st State. And though post-Meech Lake Canada is now flooded by high tides of nationalist intransigence the strength of the current surges in independentiste sentiment, of West and East, stems surely from (depending on point of view) failure (or success) in political rather than cultural affairs. Canada better represents a weak rather than a strong connection between television consumption and political identity and citizenship. But overwhelmingly the Canadian broadcasting policy discourse proceeds from the same nationalistic assumption as the European: that of the normative congruence of polity and culture. However there are persuasive arguments that Canada exemplifies a pre-echo of a new form of human community in which polity and culture are decoupled rather than an imperfect realization of an old style nation state to the condition of which it is assumed Canada must struggle to aspire. Trudeau argues that: "It is not the concept of nation that is retrograde; it is the idea that the nation must necessarily be sovereign" (Trudeau, 1968, p. 151).

Trudeau points to the potentially infinite regress possible in constituting political unities. If a political unity is only legitimate insofar as it contains no minorities who do not recognize themselves and their experience in the unit, then they are, for him, no possibilities of political coherence or of stable states. Nationalism realized in a nation state is for Trudeau simply a barbaric archaism which belongs to "a transitional period in world history" (Trudeau, 1968, p. 177). His conception of Canada is of a new kind of human society in which the maximal social unit--the state--enjoys both the freely given allegiance of its citizens and embraces citizens unified by none of the forces that have traditionally integrated national communities: language, culture, religion, geography or economic interest. Trudeau's vision is quite simply that of an idea; that seizes the opportunity presented by the historical accident of Canada to maximize the potentially latent by maintaining it as a unity out of which a new kind of human society may be conjured into existence. The nationalists of Canada's two founding groups in contrast attempt to return to the point of origin and will unravel the precarious unity of Canada by calling into existence separate nation states based on identities of language, culture and religion.

Trudeau argues that a divorce, between the paired concepts and practices of culture and politics that nationalism has wedded, is necessary in order to create stable and decent contemporary societies. And that Canada represents both the potentiality and the necessity for such a decoupling. If the two Canadian nations will abandon their desires to make polity and culture fit, to make Canada a nation state in which citizenship and cultural identity are congruent, only then will and can Canada be a "peaceable kingdom." "If the two will collaborate at the hub of a truly pluralistic state, Canada could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow's world. Better than the American melting pot" (Trudeau, 1968, pp. 178- 179).

Trudeau's theory makes better sense of the Canadian case than does old-style nationalism. His is a model that could and should be adopted by contemporary Europe. Trudeau's conception, which decouples culture and politics, would avoid the absurd spectacle of a retreat to the middle ages for a coherent vision of European identity, the involution of European cultural industries, and the slowing of adaptation to and synthesis with the "American" style and content valued by audiences and which had so fruitful an impact on British TV drama of the 1960s, on the Nouvelle Vague and New German Cinema. More important still, Trudeau reminds us that there are alternatives to a modern reiteration of the doctrine of Cuius regio eius religio (substituting culture for religion) which in the Europe of the past produced a plethora of illiberal brutalities in the name of political order. The United States with its decoupling of religion from state demonstrated in the eighteenth century that stable political units could be created without the doctrine of cuius regio eius religio. Canada in the twentieth century demonstrates that culture and politics can be similarly decoupled without political institutions crumbling. As Desaulniers pertinently observes: "in terms of nationality a person is either Canadian or not, but culturally one may be Canadian in varying degrees" (Desaulniers, 1987, p. 151).

In both instances North America represented more developed forms of human society than the European equivalents. We would be foolish to attempt (urged on by the interests of European audio-visual producers who decline to adapt to the tastes of their audiences) a culturally autarchic version of Festung Europa. Production and consolidation of national culture necessarily means discrimination in favor of endogenous and against exogenous elements. Production for the international market place requires rather a mediation between endogenous and exogenous elements. Admittedly the mediations of the market are performed on very unequal terms and the membrane that separates cultures is often only one way permeable; from the West to the East, from the North to the South, from anglophones to non-English-speakers and from the United States to the rest of the world. But in some sense an integrated market does demand dialogue, synthesis and adaptation. The representation of a culture to another rather than to itself. Not necessarily a bad thing. To that extent the erosion of national cultures and televisions under market pressures which engender co-production is positive.

Within any field of cultural production and consumption the terms national and international, chauvinistic or cosmopolitan are sites for contestation between different social political and economic interests to appropriate the honorific categories and to assign the derogatory ones to others. Within Britain as within Europe there is competition for hegemony and resources between different cultural traditions and between pluralistic and prescriptive notions of culture and identity. Given the illiberal consequences within Britain of asserting a normative national culture and identity, I see no reason to support such a notion within a wider European context. Particularly when (and this is where the U.K. view does become different to that of other Europeans and the horrible notions of national interest and national culture do unfortunately fall back into congruency) the economic interests of U.K. producers and the cultural tastes of UK consumers are not likely to be served by a normative conception of European identity which designates the U.K.'s experience of a culture orientated outward from Europe as being less European than are the European cultures which are either involuted or orientated East of the Elbe rather than West of Rockall.

Underlying the problem is a theoretical conception of a normative and necessary congruence between political cultural and economic forces. A congruence that as the world economy, foreign travel, movement of populations and international information markets become more pervasive, will become less and less sustainable. Culture--tradeable information consumed for pleasure--has a curious status here. Other forms of discourse have successfully been decoupled from politics. We no longer attribute nationality to scientific or mathematical ideas, do not persist with Newtonian rather than Leibnitzian logarithms because one is English and the other German. Nor, happily, do we discriminate against Jewish science. Why should we animate similar concepts when we deal with the products consumed in our leisure time. The transnationalization of culture is a process (always partial) of organization of individuals into horizontal rather than vertical communities. It is a phenomenon that the dominant nationalist optic misrecognizes. The nationalist paradigm of congruence of polity and culture has outworn its time. More and more this "good old thing" is waning in its potency and the "bad new thing," the Trudeauesque vision of a decoupled polity and culture, waxing. In time cuius regio eius culturo will be as quaint an archaism as cuius regio eius religio.


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