It Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time

Keith Acheson (Carleton University)

Christopher Maule (Carleton University)

Abstract: From 1974 to 1987, the financing of Canadian films was aided by two federal policies, special Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) provisions and direct lending from a government film agency. We discuss why these policies differ in their impact on the type of films produced and on the importance of developing measures for auditing their effect on film quality.

Résumé: De 1974 à 1987, deux politiques fédérales ont aidé le financement des films canadiens : une disposition spéciale pour la déduction des coûts de capital et des prêts directs d'une agence gouvernementale. Nous discutons les raisons pour lesquelles ces politiques ont des effets différents sur le genre de films produits, et explorons la problème de mesurer les caractéristiques uniques des films bénéficiant de la déduction et les caractéristiques de ceux bénéficiant à la fois de la déduction et du soutien financier de Téléfilm.


In the federal budget of 1974 a special capital cost allowance (CCA) for Canadian films was announced. This tax incentive augmented the financing efforts of the Canadian Film Development Corporation (now called Telefilm Canada) introduced six years earlier. These film financing policies were written and implemented to increase the demand for Canadian creative, technical, and managerial personnel. However, their electoral support depended on more than a concern for the economic well-being of those in the industry. These policies and the Canadian-content provisions for television which were being implemented by the CRTC in the same period were promoted as instruments for furthering Canadian culture.

The inward-looking orientation of these policies was unfortunately at odds with the commercial incentive to earn revenues in the markets of other countries from films produced here. To reduce this tension, a network of bilateral co-production treaties was developed which provided a controlled and limited route for Canadian joint ventures with financial, productive, and creative inputs from other countries to qualify for subsidised financing and receive Canadian status for broadcasting purposes.

Policies that make international marketing more costly increasingly confine sales of Canadian film rights to a domestic market of 26 million. For a particular property the market may be further restricted to linguistic submarkets, to particular age and income cohorts, and to aficionados of a particular genre. Recognition elsewhere of the need for international marketing is found in the establishment by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden of a fund to promote Nordic film and television co-productions. While the markets of each of these countries is small, collectively a larger market is available and more financing can be raised privately as well as publicly. One of the stated objectives of this fund is to promote international marketing in a regional setting.

In the tax reforms of 1987 the Canadian Government announced major changes to the capital cost provisions for films. The CCA was reduced to 30%. Although the new policy includes other features which continue to make film investments a tax shelter, the general thrust of government policy in the late 1980s is to rely less on tax incentives and more on direct lending through Telefilm.

Tax Incentives vs. Direct Lending

Tax incentive policies and direct lending are not perfect substitutes. At this juncture in the evolution of government film policy, an assessment of some of their important differences seems appropriate:

Control Over Content

CCA policy is automatic. If certain objective criteria are met, the tax credit is granted. Direct lending is discretionary and the subjective criteria of the decision makers in Telefilm are important determinants of the direction in which aid will flow. For example, discretion could be exercised to pursue cultural objectives, to enhance the marketability of Canadian produced films abroad or some combination of the two. The compromise between these two objectives reached by Telefilm affects which projects will be developed in Canada. Of course behind the rhetorical shield of pursuing either or both of these vaguely specified objectives, discretion could also be exercised for more opportunistic purposes.

Link Between Finance and Monitoring

The CCA divorces those who finance from involvement in the monitoring of the production process whereas Telefilm consciously links the two when it lends. The importance of reputations in the industry, of the unique "studio" form of organization for supervising and controlling productions, and of financial houses specializing in film financing illustrate the private mechanisms that have been developed to avoid being "ripped off." Many examples attest to the imperfection of these protective measures, but in their absence far fewer movies would reach the public. Tax incentives do not directly affect the contracting nexus whereas Telefilm can and has turned down projects because it is dissatisfied with distribution or artistic arrangements.

Predictability of the Fiscal Cost

The Government commits a fixed sum to Telefilm to finance its various programmes. When the funds run out, lending stops. In contrast, the fiscal cost of a CCA incentive is uncertain and can only be predicted with considerable noise.

Ability to Meet Other Political Objectives

Additional political objectives such as a balance in the government subsidies flowing to French-language films and English-language films or to producers in different regions are more readily attained through direct lending than through a tax incentive.

Political Fallout from a Film Success or Failure

With direct lending the government gains a more favourable political effect from a success than would be the case with the CCA. Telefilm involvement is typically noted in the credits. Few films acknowledge the aid of favourable tax treatment. With failures, no one sees the films and most individuals are unaware of their financing.

Financial Policies and Film "Quality"

All of these issues merit analysis. An important but difficult issue to address is the content or quality effect of the CCA initiative and its impact on international marketing. Even if changing the quality of products or services is not an objective of policy, inadvertent changes in quality may thwart the attainment of the actual objectives. For example, the United States and Canada imposed voluntary restraints on Japanese automotive exports in the early 1980s. An assessment of this policy which ignored the substantial upgrading in the quality of cars exported by Japan under the quotas would draw incorrect conclusions on the stimulus provided to North American production and on the costs imposed on consumers.

In contrast to the automotive example, an explicit objective of film policy is to change the characteristics of the product. Analysts and students of film policy have frequently commented, in passing, on the quality effects of Canadian film policy. For example, in his assessment of the trend to joint production of features and mini-series, Maurie Alioff described the Canadian cinema in the early 1980s as: "... a strange land, where sportswear manufacturers and government bureaucrats, peridontists and psychiatrists were gripped by a primitive and irresistible impulse to hurl money into production of excruciatingly empty movies" (Alioff, 1988, p. 9). Bird et al. in an early comprehensive report on the CCA stated that: "... the incentive fostered industry has been castigated by the critics for such sins as failing to produce sufficiently `good' films or sufficiently `Canadian' films" (1981, p. 5).

A film lending board affects quality by its choices of which projects to finance. Through determining the composition of a granting board, its mandate and its structure, a government can influence the content of films that it finances in whatever direction it wishes and is willing to pay for. In contrast, private producers determine quality by their responses to indirect policies such as the CCA or automotive trade restrictions. These in turn are shaped by the details of the policies, the structure of the industry, and the idiosyncrasies of the product or service being produced.

The CCA for Film: A Brief Description

The right to apply the allowance as a deduction against income generated from other sources and the level of the allowance at 100% consistently characterised the CCA regime between 1974 and 1988. These features were a fixed point for CCA policy, but other aspects were in a constant state of flux.

What began as a feature film incentive was broadened to cover short films, animation, television programmes, television series, and film/mini series combinations. Certification that a qualifying production was Canadian was originally the responsibility of the Solicitor General but was later transferred to an office in the Department of Communication, referred to here by its current acronym, CAVCO. For feature films, Canadian content depended on obtaining enough citizenship points for different key functions such as director, leading actors, cinematographer, screen writer etc., and having 75% of the budget spent on Canadian inputs. For the other categories adaptations of these criteria were developed. Within each category there were frequent changes in the details of the classification system. The general trend was toward increasing, or at least maintaining, protection of Canadian jobs in the face of producer initiatives to avoid some of these constraints. CAVCO or its equivalent had to make a "case law" with respect to the point system that set precedents on a number of issues, ranging from how Canadian is a landed immigrant to how to deal with key jobs shared between a foreigner and a Canadian.

The incentives created by the CCA programme also depend on other aspects of tax policy and administration. What to the outsider seem like inconsequential details can have a substantial effect on the incentives provided by the CCA. For example, if the taxpayer has other borrowed funds which are not sheltered, such as a mortgage, and interest payments on a loan to finance a film investment are deductible, the incentive to invest in films is increased. The taxpayer can reduce his mortgage by the amount borrowed to invest in the film. His or her total debt is unchanged but the interest payments on the amount "attributed" to buying the film unit is deductible. To limit the incentive created, the Department of Finance ruled that an investor had to finance an eligible film investment with at least 20% cash (5% after 1982) and had to pay back any loan for the rest within five years.

The tax authorities also had to deal with presale revenue. Should revenue that was contractually guaranteed be sheltered? Currently presale revenue decreases the value for which sheltered units can be sold except where the guarantee is certified by the Minister of Communications as being provided by a licensed broadcaster (not necessarily Canadian) or a bona fide film or tape distributor. It is our understanding that few presales do not receive certification. The incentive was also changed in 1982 when the half-year rule was introduced. Films were given a one year exemption from the rule, but after that period, only half of the value of a film investment became eligible for the CCA in the year in which it was made. The other half could be declared in the subsequent year. A significant change accompanying the recent return to a 30% allowance is the suspension for films of the half year rule.

It has been popular to sell certified film units through limited partnerships with buy back provisions, typically specifying an option to repurchase at some future date. The repurchase occurs at the earliest time at which the claim can be transferred after the film is fully depreciated. The investor claims his or her share of the CCA for tax purposes. At the repurchase date, the investor makes a capital gain or loss and thereby incurs a lower tax liability.

The rate of return could be increased even further by the investor delaying until the buy-back date payment of the amount of the investment eligible for financing by borrowing. At the buy-back date, the investor receives or pays the difference between this amount and the buy-back price. Until this leveraging possibility was closed by amendments to the Income Tax Act in 1986, an investor could commit a small percentage of the original amount and receive a relatively risk free return.

Enforcement of the conditions that have to be met to qualify for the special CCA provisions has been a concern to the tax authorities. To be certified a film has to submit an audited statement. Unfortunately, film projects are very difficult to audit effectively. There are many soft categories of expenditure and few benchmarks from which to measure and compare salaries and the value of idiosyncratic inputs. In addition, some creative and technical personnel or the producer may take claims on future income in lieu of salary payments. The "equivalent salary" used in the budget to determine the amount eligible for the CCA may be considerably in excess of the expected value of these claims.

Since the CCA investments were deemed to be securities subject to provincial law, the provincial securities commissions also became involved in the CCA programme. They were concerned with the size of promotional fees charged and the quality of the information disclosed in the prospectuses that had to be issued.

The Incentive Effects of the CCA

A film is an extremely risky undertaking. Each film is a unique entity produced by a team which forms for the project and then disbands. Resources are mobile and new working coalitions are constantly being developed in the industry. The outside investor has to assess the prospects of an often vaguely perceived project which will receive clearer definition only as production proceeds. Only a small set of informed investors are knowledgable of the capabilities of the set of individuals forming the production team and of the market for the type of film that should emerge from the process. Most investors lack the necessary information and assessment ability. The creativity involved and the absence of a clear benchmark from which to judge a project also makes it difficult to separate projects that are fraudulent or at least misrepresented from those that are not. The industry attracts and rewards both the genius and the opportunist. An investor not only has to assess the technical, creative and marketing aspects of the film but the probity of those involved.

Ignoring for the moment this rip-off problem, the present value of a film investment depends inter alia on the projected revenues, the interest rate, the CCA rate, and the tax rate.10 The general nature of these effects are summarized in Figure 1 which depicts the present values of a million dollar investment which generates revenues in the three years following its release. These revenues are assumed to total just under one and a quarter million dollars and decline in the ratios 4:2:1.11 Present values are calculated for a tax rate equal to the maximum marginal rate for the federal and provincial tax (Ontario rates are used for the provincial portion) of 44%, for various net of tax interest rates and for rates of CCA from 30% to 100%.

Each parabolically shaped line represents how the present value of the film varies as the CCA rate changes for the rate of interest identified in the legend. Below the rate of interest net of tax, the borrowing rate or the rate before taking into account tax is listed. If the borrowing rate to an investor is 14.3%, the tax rate is 44%, and the interest is deductible, the net of tax interest rate is 8%.12 At this net of tax interest rate, the shift from a CCA of 30% to one of 100% raises the net present value of the successful film by $65,000, i.e., the change in CCA is equivalent to giving the hypothetical tax payer/film investor $65,000 up front on a million dollar investment. This amount is $50,289 at 100% CCA plus a negative $14,734 at 30% CCA and appears as the difference between the intercepts of the middle line () with the vertical axes in Figure 1. Figure 1 Net Present Value to Investor: "Successful" Film

If the taxpayer borrows to finance the film investment and can shelter the other income, the incentive is increased even with the loan limitation and five-year pay back period. Figure 2 portrays the impact on the net present value of a film investment of being able to shelter income for net of tax borrowing rates from 4 to 12%, a marginal tax rate of 44%, and the more conservative loan limitation of 80%. The ability to shelter interest payments adds over 262,000 dollars to the present value at the median rate of interest (net of taxes) of 8%. This increase in present value exceeds by a factor of four the addition to the present value at this interest rate of moving to 100% depreciation from 30% with the specified tax and interest rates. Figure 2 Value of Sheltering Other Income with 80% and Five-Year Limit on One-Million-Dollar Film Investment

Acceptance of liberal payback arrangements can provide even more generous incentives for the CCA investors. These additional aspects of the CCA not only increase the fiscal cost considerably from what it would be in their absence, but they dramatically change the risk characteristics of the investment. In particular, buy back provisions can alter the instruments from extremely risky ones to ones bearing very little risk.

Effects of the CCA on Quality

The CCA made financing films easier and stimulated the industry in general. Different producers are motivated by a mix of commercial and creative factors. Some consciously limit the creative compromises that they are willing to make in order to increase revenues. Others allow commercial forces to guide and shape the project. The former can be viewed as "spending" the potential revenue forgone in order to satisfy their creative needs. The CCA provided the same incentive to all producers and did not directly alter the incentive to sacrifice commercial revenue for any "artistic" or "cultural" purposes.

On the other hand, indirect effects of the CCA favoured large projects, Canadian perspectives, and some scams. Larger projects could write off the fixed costs of issuing prospectuses and certifying a project against more potential income. If large projects are more commercially oriented than small, the industry's output would become more "commercial." Certification restricted the nationality of those who held key positions. If Canadian directors, writers, actors and other creative personnel had a different vision than those abroad, the mix of output would become more Canadian either in the stories developed or in the way stories of universal appeal were presented. Sharp operators would recycle as a new project material which was shot as part of another project or even shot elsewhere and earlier. Creative accounting and misrepresentation rather than artistic creativity would be fostered. Although general consensus might exist about the direction of these indirect effects, theory provides no guidance as to whether they were substantial or not.

Many films which received CCA funding also received funding from Telefilm. If the lending agency was exerting its potential for affecting the characteristics of films, these films should have differed qualitatively from those produced only with CCA assistance.

Testing for Quality Differences

If objective criteria sufficed to determine quality or Canadianess, CCA policy would not need to be augmented or supplanted by a process with a subjective filter. All quality objectives could be achieved by specifying the necessary conditions for obtaining tax privileges. Clearly quality and nationality, like justice or beauty, cannot be measured objectively. If the concepts are to have any common meaning, they have to be ascertainable subjectively by appropriately chosen juries, as is quality in writing by the Nobel committee.

Since quality and Canadianess contributions are at the heart of distinguishing between direct lending and tax subsidy programmes for cinema, a crucial element in ranking policy alternatives is to subject the results of each to some form of quality audit. Such an audit can reveal whether there is any common meaning for these concepts, and if there is, can distinguish what they are for films produced under different financing regimes.13 These results can also provide the basis for examining the effect of quality changes and shifts in story content on the commercial success of a film. Quantifying this effect is necessary for estimating the cost of pursuing these objectives.

As a first step in performing such an audit, we selected a random sample of 40 films from those which received CCA certification from 1974 to 1987 and which were identified as being for theatrical release.14 With the assistance of teachers of film studies a short questionnaire was designed.15 For each film the respondent is asked whether he or she has heard of and seen the film; where it was viewed; of what genre was the film; whether the film related more to a Canadian or a foreign audience; whether the story line or its presentation was distinctly Canadian; and how much the viewer enjoyed the film.

Through discussions with colleagues and students, we concluded that a random sample of the Canadian population would have viewed none or very few of the films. (Readers may be interested in testing their familiarity with our sample of 40 Canadian films which are listed in Appendix A). Therefore we asked a panel of persons with a specialised knowledge of Canadian films to fill out the questionnaire. While protecting individual confidentiality, it can be disclosed that the sixteen respondents include those who have directed and produced films, written about them, studied them, devised or implemented policies to stimulate production or been responsible for the purchase of film rights.16

The range of response within this group was considerable with one person having heard of 36 and seen 35 of the films, and one person (a Canadian film producer) having heard of and seen none of them. On average the sixteen respondents had heard of 18 and seen 9 of the 40 films. All 40 films had been heard of by at least one respondent; all but two films had been seen by at least one respondent. Their responses also suggest that the CCA films which received Telefilm funding, one half of the sample, were rated as being more enjoyable, were more attractive to Canadian audiences, and had story lines that were more distinctly Canadian than those without Telefilm funding. Over the sample of 40, Telefilm funding does appear, ex post, to detect the Canadianess of the project better than just CCA certification.17

Frequently encountered comments on CCA films are that many were never distributed or seen, that those that were released were not made available for Canadians to see, or that they were not reviewed with the same incidence or sympathy as foreign productions. None of these conventional views appear accurate for the bulk of the 40 films.

At least 33 of the 40 films have been shown on cable since 1983 or will be shown shortly. Of the 27 films that have already been aired on First Choice, the Eastern pay TV service, many have had multiple showings.18 At least eight titles are currently available for rental on home-video cassettes, and a number have been reviewed--25 in Cinema Canada19 24 in Variety (20 were reviewed in both), publications known and used by Canadian distributors, exhibitors, and broadcasters.

We emphasize that the results from the panel are only suggestive. The next step in our research agenda is to mail a slightly revised questionnaire to, and collect responses from, members of the Association of Canadian Film Studies, as well as gathering as much commercial and critical information as possible on the forty films. With this larger set of responses, hypotheses can be appropriately tested.


Both the CCA and direct lending programmes stimulate activity and the choice between them rests in part on how they affect quality. In what way quality is influenced by discretionary lending is not obvious. Because of bureaucratic frictions Telefilm films may be worse, or they may comply with the idiosyncratic tastes of those who exercise the discretion--tastes which are non-representative of any important constituency in Canada. Alternatively, they may be films of better quality that relate more to life in Canada. To our knowledge no researcher has directly addressed this issue.

Currently the government is emphasizing discretionary lending as a means of encouraging activity in the industry. If the quality assumptions implicit in this decision are warranted, the title of the first CCA film to be certified, "It seemed like a good idea at the time," provides a fitting epitaph for tax subsidy policy. If instead, Telefilm has dissipated rather than created social wealth, an opportunity is being missed to revamp its structure or to ride a more appropriate policy horse.

Appendix A Sample of 40 Canadian Films Certified for Special Capital Cost Allowance
Date Title Date Title
1976 Rabid 1980 Firebird 2015 AD
1976 Skip Tracer 1980 Happy Birthday to Me
1976 Starship Invasions 1980 Journee en Taxi (Une)
1977 Blood Relatives 1980 Plouffe (Les)
1977 High-Ballin 1980 Ticket to Heaven
1978 Ange Gardien 1981 Meat Tape (The)
1978 Fast Company 1981 Rumours of Glory
1978 Meatballs 1981 Videodrome
1978 Summer's Children 1982 Music of the Spheres (The)
1979 Double Negative 1982 Tell Me That You Love Me
1979 Girls 1983 Def-Con 4
1979 Homme a Tout Faire (L') 1983 Sang des Autres (Le)
1979 Lucky Star (Star) 1984 Adramelech
1979 Never Trust an Honest Thief 1984 Listen to the City
1979 Off Your Rocker 1985 Overnight
1979 Prom Night 1987 Carpenter (The)
1979 Scanners 1987 Cran D'Arret
1980 Alligator Shoes 1987 Down Home
1980 Bill Lee 1987 Sword of Gideon (The)
1980 L'Empereur du Perou-France 1987 Top of His Head (The)
Department of Communications, Ottawa, Listing of CCA certified productions.


The authors are respectively Professors in the Economics Department and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. We thank Peter Harcourt for his help and patience, Mark Ruston for his research assistance and Katherine and Rachel Acheson for their editorial and research help. The authors' research has been supported by a grant from the SSHRC.
For a description and analysis of Canadian content provisions see Watson (1988), Globerman (1983, 1987, 1988), and Acheson & Maule (1990).
The provinces have augmented these federal policies with direct lending and tax concessions. In addition, many municipalities and regions have film commissioners that promote their communities as desirable locations for filming.
Some consequences of the inward-looking effects of quotas based on domestic content are discussed in Acheson, Maule, & Filleul (1989).
For a description and analysis of co-productions and co-ventures see Acheson & Maule (1989). Even films that do not have the privileged access to foreign markets of co-productions depend substantially on foreign revenue. Paul Audley & Associates report that 66.2% of the revenue received from nine English-language films made in Canada and released in the April to March period of 1985/86 was earned abroad (1989, Table 1).
See, for instance, Bach's (1987) detailed and fascinating account of the making of Heavens Gate and the simultaneous "unmaking" of United Artists.
They later add: "The result is that it could well be argued that one result of the expanded investment in Canadian film production resulting from the film tax incentive has been a reduction in `truly Canadian' films (1981, p. 89).
In the 1987 reforms implemented in 1988, the CCA allowance was reduced to 30%. This amount could be applied to all sources of income. If income from films exceeded this amount the remaining 70% of the CCA could be deducted against it. An important ancillary change was that the half and half rule was suspended and all of the eligible CCA could be claimed up front. This meant that for an investor generating income from other investments in film the new provisions could be more generous, but for the sporadic investor in films they were less so.
For a gain, either the investor incurs a tax liability at the lower capital gains rate or, if the investor qualifies for the capital gains tax exemption, no tax is payable. For a capital loss, there are similar advantages. In the "at-risk" rules introduced into the income tax act in 1986, the repurchase option must be such that a reasonable investor might not exercise it.
Inflation may interact with the tax system to alter incentives. These effects are complex and are ignored here.
The assumed revenues from the rights purchased for a million dollars are: at the end of the first year after release, $701,799; after the second year, $350,900; after the third $175,450. We describe this hypothetical income stream as a success, since this revenue profile would represent an outcome well above average for a Canadian film. The CFDC commissioned a survey in 1980 which measured the returns on 33 films financed through public issues in 1977-79. The fraction of investment returned to the unit holders was 25% and only one movie made a positive return and that was negligible. (See Bird et al., 1981, p. 57, for a discussion of these results.) More recently, Paul Audley & Associates Ltd. have analyzed nine English-language feature films released in the April to March period of 1985-86 for Telefilm. The total revenues earned amounted to 33.8% of the costs of making these films (Audley, 1989, p. 8).
The present value is calculated assuming that the investor can borrow, in instruments for which the interest charges are deductible for tax purposes, sufficient amounts to rearrange payments into the stream that the investor most prefers. This assumption makes the net of tax interest rate the appropriate discount rate. The net of tax interest rates of 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, and 12% are associated with borrowing rates of 7.2%, 10.7%, 14.3%, 17.9%, and 21.5% respectively.
Telefilm, or any jury system used to make awards to producers, must make an ex ante judgment about the quality of the applicants. An auditing jury can only test ex post whether the right films were made, that is whether the right objective criteria have been chosen. However, it is a standard statistical exercise to determine whether the realizations of CCA films which receive Telefilm financing are drawn from the same quality distribution as those which do not.
There were 345 films that were identified as being for theatrical release in our data set. In addition, there were 135 television programs of at least 60-minute duration, the bulk of which we understand to be made-for-TV films.
We are especially grateful to Peter Harcourt and Zuzana Pick of the Carleton Film Studies Department for their advice and assistance.
Although the group was not selected randomly from the population of knowledgeable film people, we consider the panel representative of this population.
One of many caveats to this result is that the general public may defer to and agree with an experts' opinion of cinematographic and aesthetic quality, but not do so with respect to Canadianism. Elsewhere we have argued that there is likely to be little agreement in a multicultural Canada of what constitutes Canadianism and consequently we would expect wide divergencies in the answers to the Canadianism questions. The panel answers did not reveal such divergencies, but that may reflect only that this sample of professional people in the industry have a common view of this concept. This common view may not be in concordance with that of other Canadians.
Almost all Canadian films are shown on conventional television or the specialty cable channels. The conditions of license for the specialty channels are such that the rights to Canadian films are bought and are broadcast at some time of the day or night, as long as they are, in the words of one executive, "in focus."
Cinema Canada was a unique publication emphasizing the non-commercial aspects of Canadian cinema. Unfortunately it has ceased publication. Playback provides more commercially oriented information about the Canadian industry. Variety is an American publication with international coverage that is referred to and read by almost everyone in the business. For world markets and for individual markets Variety provides both critical and commercial commentary written in its unique style.


Acheson, Keith, & Maule, Christopher. (1989, December). The higgledy-piggledy trade environment for films and programs: The Canadian example. World Competition, 13(2), 47-62.

Acheson, Keith, Maule, Christopher, & Filleul, Elizabet. (1989, December). The folly of quotas in international trade of films and television programs. World Economy, 12(4), 515-524.

Acheson, Keith, & Maule, Christopher. (1990, September). Canadian content rules: A time for reconsideration. Canadian Public Policy, 16(3), 284-297.

Alioff, Maurie. (1988, September). The Minee-Feechie experiment: Birth of a monster, or brave new film world? Cinema Canada.

Audley, Paul, & Associates Ltd. (1989, November). Study of the revenues earned by Canadian productions (Draft of a study prepared for Telefilm Canada).

Bach, Stephen. (1987). Final cut. New York: Onyx.

Bird, R. M., Bucovetsky, M. W., & Yatchew, A. (1981, December). Tax incentives for the Canadian film industry. Toronto: Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto.

Globerman, Steven. (1983). Cultural regulation in Canada. Montreal: The Institute for Research in Public Policy.

Globerman, Steven. (1987). Culture, governments and markets, public policy and the culture industries. Vancouver: Fraser Institute.

Globerman, Steven. (1988). What we know and don't know about the economics of culture. Paper presented at the Fifth International Conference on Cultural Economics, Ottawa, September 28-30.

Turner, D. J. (Ed.). (1987). Canadian feature film index, 1913-1985. Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada.

Watson, William. (1988). National Pastimes. Vancouver: Fraser Institute.

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